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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

NSC review completed.

National Intelligence Council

NIC 8233-82
12 October 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

[] NIO/NESA

SUBJECT: Policy Papers for Phase II Withdrawals in Lebanon:
Talking Points for Meeting with Judge Clark

1. Policy papers circulated 12 October on Lebanon envisage the following:

- Stage 1 disengagement which would place Israeli forces south of the Damascus-Beirut highway in vicinity of the 40 kilometer line from Israel's border; Syrian forces approximately 5 kilometers north of the road from the western crestline of the Sannin mountains to the Syrian border; Peacekeeping Force (PKF) of about 10,500 men along the highway itself. Options envisaged for manning the PKF are an expanded Multi-National Force (MNF), a new mandated UNIFIL, or a combination or transitional arrangement of the two. The PLO, under this scenario, would withdraw with the Syrians.
- Destinations for the PLO in north Lebanon, which envisages either: sending all to Syria; or sending part to Syria and distribute among other Arab recipient countries.
- Establishment of a Stage II southern Lebanon 10-15,000 PKF, different from the Stage I force along the Damascus-Beirut road. Options considered are an expanded Multi-National Force; an expanded UNIFIL; or beginning with an MNF and transitioning to UNIFIL. Options for deployment are: around edges of a 40 kilometer zone from Israel's borders; PKF deployment around edges of zone and also throughout interior of the zone; PKF deployment around and inside the zone, but progressively turning over responsibilities in interior to the Lebanese army as soon as possible.
- Termination of Belligerency: An examination of the legal and practical options open to bringing about a termination of belligerency and guarantee of Israel's northern security -- without the politically impossible signing of a Lebanese-

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This Memo is classified

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
Israeli Peace Treaty. There are a number of options available along this line.

- Reconstruction of Lebanon, which envisages the need for an additional authorization of \$100 million for the FY 1983-84 period.

2. While the above papers are fine as far as they go, it must be noted that final Palestinian withdrawal from northern Lebanon and the northern Bika' is uncertain. It is probable that armed Palestinians will remain in or return to these areas, even if the Syrians and Israelis do reach an agreement for total withdrawal. They would remain for one of the following reasons: lack of detection upon initial withdrawal; Syrian encouragement of their presence in order to render progress on overall peace issues difficult; outright refusal to withdraw initially; lack of agreement of recipient countries to accept them. The key problem is that no force is available which will compel them to leave, until the Lebanese army is prepared to shoulder the burden -- 1-2 years away at best. The President needs to be aware of this, and not be committed to a presence of US forces in an MNF until this area is entirely pacified. In other words, all foreign forces will probably not be out for an indefinite period. I would think we could honorably terminate our own commitment when an agreement for stage two total withdrawals has been achieved - or at most when Syrians and Israelis actually do withdraw. We should not await total pacification in the north.

3. FYI: There is considerable JCS opposition to even contemplating tying up US forces in a southern area MNF. They also estimate casualties will be taken by an MNF deployed outside of Beirut.

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